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I. INTRODUCTION

The People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) is moving towards becoming
the biggest economy in the world. The P.R.C., like India, is on the fast
track to usurping Germany, Japan and the United States in this regard. A
huge export of artificially low-priced Chinese-made products is one of the
primary reasons behind this growth. Currency manipulation, government
subsidies, and repression of workers' rights--cumulatively help to create
artificially low prices.' The P.R.C.'s ability to offer cheap labor is mainly
due to lax labor laws, routine violations of workers' rights, the non-uniform
implementation of these labor laws, and the loopholes that exist in them.
The unfair competitive advantage the P.R.C. enjoys in the international
market translates into trade deficits with other countries, like the one with
2
the United States, which now stands at more than 123 billion U.S. dollars.
The Labor Contract Law (LCL)-which became effective on January
1, 2008 3 -significantly increases workers' rights and consequently, the cost
for their labor services. The price for Chinese-made products that were
traditionally produced at very inexpensive rates, will translate into higher
costs for the producers including U.S. foreign investment enterprises
(FIEs). The U.S. administration has yet to officially support the P.R.C.'s
LCL. The U.S. administration should strongly support the LCL, not in spite
of the fact that it will increase labor costs for U.S. FIEs in the P.R.C., but
because it will necessarily increase production costs. By supporting the
P.R.C. in their efforts to decrease labor abuses and exploitation of workers
by domestic and foreign businesses, the United States will provide the
international strength and global support needed to advance workers' rights.
In addition to promoting the LCL for traditional reasons, the United States
should officially support the LCL because many U.S. FIEs in the P.R.C.
will look towards the United States for guidance. If the United States
strongly supports the LCL, then U.S. FIEs will be more likely to abide by it.
Consequently, production costs will increase, thereby making it less likely
that the United States will continue to import the massive amounts of
Chinese-made products it currently does.

1.
Brett Gibson, Legislative Representative, AFL-CIO Indus. Union Council, Implications of
US-China-Pacific Trade and Investment Trends, Address to the US Int'l Trade Comm'n on US-China
Trade,
available
at
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/manufacturing
/upload/GibsonChina2007O308.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2009).
2.
United States Census Bureau, Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance) with
China,
FOREIGN
TRADE
STATISTICS,
available
at
http://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c5700.html#2009 (last visited Sept. 29, 2009).
3.
Lao dong he tong fa, Labor Contract Law (P.R.C.) (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Jun. 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), 2008 China Law Lexis 2288.
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This note will explain why the LCL is a welcome addition to the
existing body of labor law in the P.R.C., and it will further explain the
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the LCL including internal and
external pressures. This note will introduce the LCL, its purpose, and the
main provisions that will increase labor costs for American FIEs; the LCL's
impact on American FlEs, including increases in labor costs and litigation;
the problems concerning its implementation and the bias in the courts; the
loopholes that exist in the LCL that help FIEs, and provide a new
justification for the U.S. administration to support the LCL.
II. THE ERA BEFORE THE LCL-A WEAK BODY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAWS

Before the implementation of the LCL, there was no cohesive body of
laws regulating labor and employment law 4, including those found in the
P.R.C. Constitution. The first wave of modern labor law reformattempting to cure the deficiencies-appeared in 1994 with the passage of
the Labor Law, a response to large-scale protests denouncing workers'
exploitation. 5 The 1994 Labor Law made significant strides towards
protecting workers from employer exploitation but did not fully succeed.
There were two main reasons why the 1994 Labor Law only minimally
decreased employee exploitation. First, the local, as opposed to the
national, governments were the primary source of implementation of these
laws, and therefore these laws varied from district to district. 6 Secondly,
the 1994 Labor Law was perceived by employers and enforcers as a
voluntary and non-binding measure which led some employers to routinely
violate its provisions. 7 Therefore, while the 1994 Labor Law seemingly
protected workers from exploitation by, for example, stipulating that
laborers could not work for more than eight hours a day,8 there was a lack
of adequate enforcement. 9 Some reports revealed that workers-in the

4.
Jeffrey A. Blount & Lixin Chen, Working with China's New Labor Contract Law, in
DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 2008, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE COURSE HANDBOOK 129, 131 (2008),
availableat 1681 PLI/Corp 129 (Westlaw) (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
5.
See Feng Xu, Labor Law Developments in China: The Emergence Of Temporary Staffing
Agencies In China,30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 431, 448 (2009) [hereinafter Xu].
6.

Blount & Chen, supra note 4, at 131.

7.

See id.

8.
Lao dong he tong fa, Labor Law (P.R.C.) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Sept. 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) (P.R.C.), 1995 China Law LEXIS 764.
9.
Winston Zhao, Owen D. Nee Jr., & Jones Day, Ensuring Compliance with China's New
Labor Laws, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 2008, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW AND
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southern manufacturing district of China-were forced to work twelve-hour
days, six days a week and eight hours on Sundays; there were frequent
delayed payment of wages and employees needed permission to resign.'
The weak enforcement has led labor-rights' activists and international
critics to accuse the P.R.C.'s authorities of willful blindness to employee
exploitation." In essence, the 1994 Labor Law was viewed as a nonbinding voluntary proposal by domestic and foreign investment enterprises
and because there were no enforcement mechanisms in place the provisions
were neither respected nor enforced.

III. THE LCL WAS ADOPTED AMID A LABOR CONTROVERSYTHE TIDE SHIFTS
Massive labor protests prompted the adoption of the LCL on July 7,
2007.12 The labor protests were in reaction to the Chinese press reports
revealing that some workers "were kept like slaves in brickworks," which
subsequently became a "national matter."' 3 In the Shanxi and Henan
provinces, police freed nearly 600 workers held as slave laborers, many of
them children. 14 Partly because of the widespread reaction to this
horrifying story, the LCL was5 quickly adopted on June 29, 2007 to become
effective on January 1, 2008. '
IV. THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE LCL-HARMONIOUS EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS
The stated purpose of the LCL is to institute and further a harmonious
relationship between employers and employees. 16 The President and
Supreme Leader of the P.R.C., Hu Jintao, stated that the goal of the
"Harmonic Society" is akin to the "Long March" from the civil war;
however, he declared that "this journey would be just as challenging with

PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK 149, 155 (2008), availableat 1681 PLI/Corp 149 (Westlaw) [hereinafter
Zhao, Nee Jr., & Day] (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
10.

Blount & Chen, supra note 4, at 131-32.

11.

Id.at 132.

12.

Xu, supranote 5, at 448-49.

13.
Wolfgang Daubler & Qian Wang, The New Chinese Employment Law, 30 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL'Y J. 395, 404 (2009) [hereinafter Daubler & Wang].
14.
Joseph Kahn & David Barboza, As Unrest Rises, China Broadens Workers' Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Jun. 30, 2007, at Al, available at ProQuest 1297271211 [hereinafter Kahn & Barboza] (last
visited Oct. 20, 2009).
15.

Labor Contract Law; Zhao, Nee Jr., & Day, supra note 9, at 158.

16.

Labor Contract Law art. 1.
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hazards and risks". 17 In essence, the law was formulated to improve labor
relations by specifying workers' rights and the duties of parties to labor
contracts. In so doing, the legal reform would protect the legitimate
interests of workers
and thus create stable and harmonious employment
8
relationships.1

V. THE ADOPTION OF THE LCL-THE INTERNAL AND
EXTERNAL PRESSURES

"Both the National People's Congress (NPC) and its Standing
Committee (NPC SC) have the authority . . ." pursuant to the P.R.C.
Constitution to pass laws. 19 The NPC has about 3000 delegates and meets
approximately once a year to pass "basic laws" regarding criminal, civil,
and other matters.2 ° On the other hand, the NPC SC, with a membership of
150 delegates, meets throughout the year when the NPC is not in session, to
21
enact "ordinary laws" which are not specifically delegated to the NPC.
Despite the seemingly overlapping nature of their rights and duties to pass
laws, a trend has emerged that delineates the perimeter for passing laws.
Basic laws, which are exclusive to the NPC, include criminal law and
procedure, property law, and economic and contract law.22 Ordinary laws,
including labor and employment law, are traditionally passed by the NPC
23

SC.

From nearly its inception, the NPC SC controlled the drafting process
of the new LCL and held open debates amongst themselves.24 There was a
caucus that believed that there should be an explicit bias in favor of the
traditionally exploited employee. On a more cogent side of the spectrum
was a group of delegates that believed that an explicit bias would scare FIEs
into neighboring countries, like Vietnam, for cheap labor. Those members
favoring an explicit bias in favor of employees reasoned that workers were
the weaker party who adhered to a standard labor contract written by the
economically stronger employer.25 Therefore, employee advocates in the

17.

Daubler & Wang, supra note 13, at 408.

18.

Labor Contract Law art. 1.

19.
Hilary K. Josephs, Measuring Progress Under China's Labor Law: Goals, Processes,
Outcomes, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y. J. 373, 377 (2009) [hereinafter Josephs].
20.

Id.

21.

Id.

22.

Id. at 378.

23.

Id.

24.

Josephs, supranote 19, at 381.

25.

Id.
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NPC SC favored a provision, which was not incorporated, that any
ambiguity in the LCL would be construed in favor of the employee.2 6
Meanwhile, those favoring neutrality disfavored a provision, which was
incorporated, that required severance pay for employees whose fixed-term
contracts had lapsed.27 Overall, the LCL is riddled with this tension
between neutrality and an overt bias in favor of employees.
In addition to the internal debates, there were external pressures from
different interest groups opposing the LCL. The government allowed
public comments to be made on the first draft of the LCL and received more
than 190,000 responses.28 Among the communications, there were strong
oppositions by various FIEs, complaints from workers concerning unpaid
overtime wages, delayed payment of wages, non-payment of social
insurance premiums, and concerns by labor dispatch agencies (LDAs), also
known as personnel staffmg agencies, that a provide temporary workforce
29
to companies.
However, the strongest and most organized opposition came from
foreign businesses operating in the P.R.C. Because the LCL's central tenet
requires companies to conclude written contracts with their employees 3 -a
provision likely to increase labor costs because of the lack of workforce
flexibility3 -many American corporations strongly lobbied against this
32
new law through their Chambers of Commerce or local trade associations.
For example, the American Chamber of Commerce in China (AmCham)
vigorously lobbied against the LCL stating that it would increase labor costs
and would make products less competitive.3 3 In addition, some large U.S.
multinational corporations waged a strong lobbying campaign against the
LCL.34 Some even threatened to move their businesses to Vietnam.35 At
least one commentator believes that the negative press these organizations

26.

Id.

27.

Id.at 382.

Blount & Chen, supra note 4, at 131; AsiaLaw.com, Preview of China's Draft Labour
Law,
http://www.asialaw.com/Article/1971109/Preview-of-Chinas-Draft-Labour-ContractLaw.html?Print=true&Single--true (last visited Sept. 29, 2009).
28.

29.

Josephs, supra note 19, at 385.

30.

Labor Contract Law art. 10.

31

See infra § VII.

32.
Joe W. (Chip) Pitts II, Corporate Social Responsibility:
Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 334,400-01 (2009).
33.

Current Status and Future

Xu, supra note 5, at 454-55.

34.
David Barboza, China Drafts Law to Empower Unions and End Labor Abuse, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2006, at Al.
35.

Xu, supranote 5, at 455.
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received in the West--essentially labeling them "anti-union"-were
unfounded; since many FIEs brought their labor practices into the P.R.C.,
Chinese workers were essentially treated the same as workers in the United
States.36 In essence, most American FIEs argue that the LCL established
standards too high for a country historically known for its cheap labor
market.37 Despite AmCham's lobbying campaign against the LCL and
some American FIEs threatening to move their businesses to Vietnam,
some high profile FIEs distanced themselves from the negative reactions to
the LCL. Particularly, Nike revoked its support for the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce in Shanghai.3 8
The temporary staffing industry lobbied against two articles of the
LCL, which were eventually taken out. The first of these two articles
required the LDA to deposit 5000 yuan 39 for every one of its employees in a
government-designated bank account; the second article required a
dispatched employee who worked for the same corporate client for more
than one year to terminate the contract with the LDA and sign a labor
contract with the corporate client, if the company intended to keep the
employee. 40 The final version of the LCL obliges LDAs to sign a labor
contract for at least two years with employees and pay the local minimum
wage to employees for whom the LDAs have not found employment with
an employer.4 '
VI. THE LCL's MAIN PROVISIONS WHICH INCREASE LABOR COSTS FOR

AMERICAN FIES
Notwithstanding the provisions concerning labor unions, the articles of
the LCL that most impact the rising cost of labor for FIEs include the
obligation to conclude written contracts with all full-time employees, the
non-fixed term employment relationship, the various situations in which
employees are entitled to severance pay, and the regulations regarding the
labor dispatch industry.

36.

Zhao, Nee Jr., & Day, supra note 9, at 159.

37.

Xu, supra note 5, at 455.

38.

Id.

39.
Equivalent to approximately 732 US dollars, exchange rate from yuans to dollars as of
September 18, 2009. Google Unit Conversion, www.google.com/UnitConversion (last visited Oct. 5,
2009).
40.

Xu, supra note 5, at 455.

41.

Labor Contract Law art. 58 para. 2.
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A. The LCL 's Central Tenet-the Obligation to Conclude Written Labor
Contracts
There are three types of employment contracts stipulated in the LCL:
fixed-term, non-fixed term, and project-specific contracts.42 Regardless of
the type, an employer must conclude a written contract with all of its
employees and has a one month grace period-starting from the date the
employee started working-in which to comply. 43 This is the foundation
and the heart and soul of the LCL. If the employer fails to abide by the
requirement to sign an employment contract-for more than one month but
less than a year-then he/she must pay double the employee's salary for
every month the employee was working without a contract and still sign a
written labor contract. 44 If the employer abstains from signing a labor
contract with the employee for one year or more, then the employment
relationship automatically becomes one based on a non-fixed term labor
contract-which will later be explained to have its own serious
repercussions.4 5 The employment contract must identify the employer and
employee, contain basic contact information of both parties, specify the
employment period, job description, place of work, working hours, breaks
and leave, remuneration, social insurance benefits, labor protection,
working conditions, protections against occupational hazards, and other
requisite terms. 46 In addition, the employer and employee may negotiatewhile still respecting the law-additional clauses in the employment
contract such as probationary periods, training, confidentiality,
supplementary insurance, and other benefits. 47 The LCL creates a floor of
minimum standards for employees while leaving the parties to the labor
contract the opportunity to negotiate better terms. The requirement to have a
written labor contract for every employee creates an obligation previously
unknown or unpracticed by most employers, thus reducing workforce
flexibility for the employer and hence increasing labor costs.

42.

Id. art. 12.

43.

Id. art. 10.

44.
Shi shi gui li zai zhong hua ren min gong he guo, Implementing Regulations of the
People's Republic of China on Labor Contract Law art. 6 (promulgated by the State Council, Sept. 18,
2008, effective Sept. 18, 2008), 2008 China Law Lexis 204; see also Labor Contract Law art. 82 para. 2.
45.

Implementing Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Labor Contract Law art.

46.

Labor Contract Law art. 17.

47.

Id. art. 17 para. 2.

7.
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B. Cap on Fixed-Term Contracts-LessFlexibilityForFIEs
In the past, employers would entertain a flexible workforce by
executing multiple and consecutive fixed-term employment contracts
without any consequences.4 8 For example, an employer would conclude a
two year employment contract, followed by a one year contract, and then
another two year contract, thus maintaining flexibility over the workforce.4 9
Currently, the LCL permits an employer to conclude no more than two
consecutive fixed-term employment contracts with an employee; after the
second fixed-term employment contract-and if the employer and
employee intend to continue the employment relationship-the employee
will automatically have a non-fixed term employment contract.5 ° In
addition, the employee will be entitled to a non-fixed term employment
contract if he has worked consecutively for the employer for ten years or
more. 5' In both situations, the employee may waive his rights to a fixedterm contract, if he/she so chooses.5 2 However, if the employee chooses to
enforce his/her rights pursuant to the law and demand a non-fixed term
employment contract-but the employer does not comply-then the
employer will be sanctioned and be required to pay double the salary of the
employee starting from the day the non-fixed term contract was supposed to
begin.53 These provisions create new and costly obligations for employers.
C. Non-Fixed Term Employment Contracts-MoreRigid than the
American Counterpart
A corporation's greatest fear concerns the provisions concerning nonfixed term contracts.5 4 A non-fixed term employment contract is unlike its
American counterpart-which is typically known as at-will employment.55
In the United States, an employer may unilaterally terminate an
employment at-will relationship without serious repercussions, for good
cause, bad cause or no cause at all. However, in China, a non fixed-term
employment contract may only be terminated for good cause and with
48.

Zhao, Nee Jr., & Day, supra note 9, at 162-63.

49.

Id.

50.

Labor Contract Law art. 14 para. 2 (3).

51.

Id. art. 14 para. 2 (1).

52.

Id. art. 14 para. 2.

53.

Id. art. 82 para. 2.

54.

Xu, supra note 5, at 456.

55.

Jian Hang, Understanding China's Newly Adopted Labor Contract Law, in DOING

BUSINESS IN CHINA 2008, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK 105, 109 (2008), availableat 1681 PLlI/Corp 105 (Westlaw) (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
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severance pay, creating serious obligations for the employer. In that sense,
the main difference between a non fixed-term employment contract and a
fixed-term employment contract is that the latter expires automatically,
while both warrant severance pay. 6 Consequently, this increases labor
costs for American FIEs who would rather maintain a flexible workforce.
D. ProbationaryPeriods-Stricterthan Ever
Prior to the passage of the LCL, probationary periods were highly
discretionary, and employers used it as a tool for exploitation. Employers
controlled the length of the probationary period, terminated without cause,
and paid less than the amount to be paid after the probation period or even
less than the local minimum wage.5 7 Now, the LCL calculates the
probationary period based on the term of the employment contract. For a
contract duration of less than three months or for a specified completion of
work, the probation periods are prohibited; for a contract with a three month
duration or more but less than a year, the probationary period is one month;
for a contract duration of one year or more but less than 3 years, the
probationary period is a maximum of two months; if the contract duration is
for three years or more or constitutes an open-ended contract, then the
probationary period cannot exceed six months. 58 Likewise, the LCL
provides that an employee on probation must not be paid less than eighty
percent of the salary agreed upon in the employment contract post
probationary period, or not lower than eighty percent of the lowest salary
for the same job with the same employer-but in neither circumstance can
the probation period wage be less than the local minimum wage.5 9
E. Employees' Rights to Terminate Contracts and Receive Severance Pay
The situations in which employees are entitled to severance pay
pursuant to the LCL are more extensive than ever before, hence
significantly increasing labor costs. 60 There are many enumerated instances
where an employee may unilaterally terminate the employment contract and
receive severance pay. For example, if the employer's rules and policies

56.

Blount & Chen, supra note 4, at 133.

57.

Id. at 134.

58.

Labor Contract Law art. 19.

59.
Labor Contract Law art. 20; Implementing Regulations of the People's Republic of China
on Labor Contract Law art. 15.
60.
Meg Utterback, Utterback on Chinas Labor Contract Law, LExISNEXIS EXPERT
COMMENTARIES, Jan. 14, 2008, at 4-6, available at 2008 Emerging Issues 1778 (Lexis) (last visited
Oct. 20,2009).
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violate the law thereby harming the employee or his interests, then the
employee may sever employment ties and receive severance pay. 6' This
would be cause for concern to any domestic or foreign investment
enterprise which have not updated their employment manuals outlining the
company's policies which may otherwise violate the law.
In addition, an employee is not required to provide notice prior to
terminating the employment contract and is still entitled to severance pay
for a slew of statutory reasons concerning employees' workplace safety.
More precisely, the employee will be entitled to severance pay-and not be
required to provide notice of termination of the employment contractwhen the employer fails to provide safety measures,62 fails to pay wages on
time and in full, 63 or fails to contribute to social insurance premiums for
employees as required by law. 64 Furthermore, the employer must also pay
severance if the employer compels the employee to work or conclude a
contract using coercion, violence, threats, or unlawful restriction of personal
freedom, 65 or when the employer instructs the employee to perform
dangerous tasks, thus putting the employee's safety at risk.66 In all these
circumstances, the employer's costs substantially increase because the LCL
creates new and extensive obligations to pay severance. However, when an
employee deceives the employer or moonlights, the employer may
terminate the employment relationship for cause.67
Severance pay is calculated based on the number of years the
employee has continuously worked for the employer: one month's salary is
to be paid for every year of service or portion thereof, if the employee
worked for at least six months, while working less than six months will be
rewarded with half a month's salary.68 In turn, salary is defined as the
employee's average monthly wages over a twelve month period
immediately preceding the termination of his employment contract.6 9
However, to lessen the burden on employers, severance pay is calculated
from the LCL's effective date, January 1, 2008, and not from when the
employee started working-which may have been many years before

61.

Labor Contract Law art. 38 (4).

62.

Id. art. 38 (1).

63.

Id. art. 38 (2).

64.

Id. art. 38 (3).

65.

Id. art. 38 para. 2.

66.

Labor Contract Law art. 38 par. 2.

67.

Blount & Chen, supra note 4, at 138.

68.

Labor Contract Law art. 47.

69.

Id. art. 47 para. 3.
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2008.70 In addition, if the employee earned three times as much as the
average employee in the district, then the severance pay will be "three times
. . . the average monthly wages of employees' . . ." as determined by the
local government. 7 1 Notwithstanding the provisions capping the amount of
severance to be paid per employee, the fact that there are many more
situations requiring the payment of severance creates a substantial increase
of labor costs for employers, including American FIEs.
F. IncreasedInvolvement of Labor Unions
The LCL presupposes that labor unions are established in all domestic
and foreign investment enterprises; as such, it grants labor unions'
increased involvement which in turn increases labor costs significantly. In
addition, the LCL may be interpreted as strongly encouraging foreign and
domestic enterprises to establish labor unions by acknowledging-in the
language of the LCL-that labor unions already exist in the workplace.72 In
fact, the Communist Party and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) have quotas to establish union presence in ninety percent of all
private corporations, including FIEs.73
An employer must give prior notice to the labor union when
unilaterally terminating an employment contract, even when an employee is
not a member of the union.74 The labor union may even channel the
interests of the employee and demand reinstatement. 75 The LCL further
requires that the employer consider the opinions of the labor union and
inform the union of its final decision.76 For example, if the employer
terminates an employment contract in violation of the law, then the
employee is entitled to reinstatement,77 and the labor union can rally for the
worker's rights in this regard. If reinstatement is impossible-because the
worker has been replaced-then the employer must pay the employee
double the amount of severance pay owed as a penalty.78 In general,

70.

Id. art. 97 para. 3.

71.

Id. art. 47 para. 2.

72.
Lesli Ligorner & Monica Lynn Debiak, Navigating the New Employment Contract Law,
CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, § 2, Jul., 2007, availableat ProQuest 10126724 (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
73.
Employment Law PromptsForeign Companies to Clean House, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE,
§ 57, Jul., 2007, available at ProQuest 1319071201 (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
74.

Labor Contract Law art. 43.

75.

Id.

76.

Id.

77.

Labor Contract Law art. 48.

78.

Id.
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arbitrators and courts have utilized the payment of double severance pay as
a penalty, but in some cases they have ordered reinstatement. 79 The
obligation to pay double the salary as payment for failure to lawfully
terminate an employment contract is indeed a hefty fine for employers who
previously took the lax labor laws for granted.
Lastly, clauses in an employment contract that exploit workers and/or
infringe on their statutory rights will render the contract invalid.80 For
instance, securing consent of an employee through threats or duress,8 ' a
contract containing terms contrary to the provisions of the LCL, 2 a written
waiver of the employee's statutory rights-are all examples of invalid
contracts.8 3 Hence, any deviation in the employment contract to the
obligations set forth in the LCL will be considered, in part or in whole,
invalid. This creates a heavy burden on employers who seek to maintain a
flexible workforce.
VII. THE LCL'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN FLES-THE RISING COST OF

DOING BUSINESS
While some experts believe that the LCL replaces and abridges the
1994 Labor Law, others think that it simply elaborates and builds upon
existing rights. 84 However, most observers agree that employees' rights are
extensively increased by this new development in Chinese labor law.85
A. Vague Laws Confuse FIEs
The LCL is vague in many respects. For example, although the
purpose of the LCL is to foster harmonious employment relationships, the
result may be quite the opposite whereby adhering to the LCL's obligations
creates animosity and distrust. The P.R.C.'s central government recognized
that the lack of governmental interpretation prevented the complete and
uniform implementation of the LCL. For direction, the government must
issue guiding opinions since court interpretations in the P.R.C.'s civil law
society do not adhere to stare decisis8 6 The central government has been
79.

Blount & Chen, supranote 4, at 142.

80.

Labor Contract Law art. 26.

81.

Id. art. 26 (1).

82.

Id.art. 26 (3).

83.

Id. art. 26 (2).

84

See Josephs, supra note 19, at 379.

85.

See id. at 383-84.

86.
Lauren Carasik, "Think Glocal, Act Glocal": The Praxis of Social Justice Lawyering in
the Global Era, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 55, 117 (2008).
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late with issuing guiding opinions and hence some local governments have
issued their own clarifications of the LCL, thereby contributing to the nonuniform implementation of the law. For example, the Guangdong province
issued its own guiding principles before the central government released its
own. The key clarification in the Guangdong guiding principles is that the
objective of the legislation-a harmonious employment relationship---must
correspond with the social effect of the law by analyzing the ultimate
outcome by applying the LCL and not merely applying it in a social
vacuum.8 7 Therefore, many FIEs are confused about how the LCL's
obligations work in practice. Although there have been a few Chinese legal
commentaries on the ambiguities, in which gaps and loopholes are present,
such legal commentaries that would help interpret its meaning have no legal
force and effect on the LCL's interpretation, because only the government
has that authority to the exclusion of courts and commentators.88
B. The LCL IncreasesFIEs' Labor Costs
Since the P.R.C. opened its doors to foreign investors in the late 1970s,
there has been a growing number of FIEs establishing manufacturing plants.
There are currently more than 570,000 FIEs in the P.R.C., and they employ
more than twenty-eight million Chinese workers-mainly in the coastal
cities. 89 In 2008, there was 2.9 billion U.S. dollars in American nonfinancial foreign direct investment (FDI) in China.90 These investments
constitute American businesses that have invested in projects and not just
monetary resources into China that mainly employ Chinese workers.
U.S. officials predicted on May 7, 2009 that 2009 would continue to be
a challenging year for U.S. companies based in China as opposed to those

87.
Joanna Law, Labour Law: State Council Delays, as Guangdong Makes it Better, CHINA
LAW & PRACTICE, Sept., 2008, available at ProQuest 1572464961 (last visited Oct. 20, 2009);
GuangdongProvince, Guiding Opinion on Several Issues Concerningthe Application of the Law (Law
on the Meditation and Arbitration of Employment Disputes) and the (Employment Contract Law),
CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, Sept., 2008, availableat ProQuest 1572464631 (last visited Oct. 20,2009).
88.
Daubler & Wang, supra note 13, at 405-06. The lack of Chinese legal commentary is due
to the Chinese culture's repression of individual observations; such observations would constitute an
undesirable self-aggrandizement of the individual.
89.
Zhao, Nee Jr., & Day, supra note 9, at 159; see Samuel Estreicher, Michael J. Gray, &
Winston Zhao, Preparingfor China's New Employment Contract Law, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE
COUNSEL,
Nov.,
2007,
at
33,
available
at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com
/current.php?artType-view&artMonth=November&artYear=2007&EntryNo=7428 (last visited Sept. 25,
2009).
90.
The US-China Business Council, Foreign Direct Investment
http://www.uschina.org/statistics/fdi cumulaive.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
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based in the United States. 9' Due to the various LCL requirements that
increase labor costs and decrease workforce flexibility, 92 it is estimated that
some labor-intensive businesses will have to raise their selling prices or
move to neighboring countries that offer a cheaper labor force. For
example, Olympus Corp.9 3 and Yue Yuen Industrial Ltd.94 are among

companies shifting some production to Vietnam to cut costs. 95 There are
some commentators who believe that many FIEs do not commit serious
labor violations in the P.R.C., and therefore it is unlikely that they will alter
their practices or policies at least at the onset.9 6 However, most American
FIEs operating in China believe that the LCL will negatively affect their
businesses-mainly based on the obligation to conclude and enforce written
labor contracts with all personnel, thus limiting their workplace flexibility. 97
Manufacturers, especially in labor intensive industries, will continue to
experience rising costs and witness their products become less competitive
in the global market with the adoption of the LCL. The improved working
conditions will enable Chinese workers to be treated more equitably thus
helping to close the gap of disparate treatment with workers from developed
countries. In addition, the corollary cost increases will, over time, further
narrow the trade imbalance as the price of Chinese-made goods become less
competitive. Furthermore, since the P.R.C. constitutes such a large portion
of the world's manufacturing capacity, the improved working conditions
will make an impact on neighboring countries towards labor law reform. If
more and more developing countries take the step towards labor law reform,
like the P.R.C. to create harmonious employment relationships, which
inevitably increases the wealth of workers, companies will have a more
global consumer base willing and able to purchase goods and services. The

US. Official Predicts Difficult U.S.-China Trade Relations in 2009, INSIDE US TRADE,
91.
May 15, 2009, availableat 2009 WLNR 9293476 (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
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/bizchina/2008-01/01/content6362688.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Labor ContractLaw
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increased consumer base could only help American companies looking for
new markets in which to sell their products.
Perhaps the most direct and immediate consequence of FIEs remaining
in China is the need to update their employment manuals and revise
employment contracts, and policies to ensure compliance with the LCL.
They have had to employ law firms and experts to undertake this project at
costly rates. Many FIEs have indeed revised or are updating their
employment manuals, policies and contracts to comply with the LCL while
other FIEs have taken a wait and see approach.98 The wait and see
approach may be a wise tactic for those circumstances that require further
clarifications from the government.
C. LitigationIncreases-NoEscapefor FIEs
The LCL has caused a sharp increase in litigation. This is mainly
because the LCL was so well publicized that Chinese workers all over the
country were made aware of their new and increased rights and because it is
now free to file a claim.99 Chinese lawyers were reported to have a
multitude of employees ready to sue FIEs when the LCL was passed. Most
experts agree that the prime targets for suits are U.S. companies because of
their deep pockets.'00 To put a figure to the fact, 60,000 applications were
set for arbitration at the end of 2008 in the Guangdong province-known as
China's manufacturing hub-which is more than double the amount in the
previous two years combined.'0 °
Prior to the adoption of the LCL, an employee would be charged the
equivalent of seventy three U.S. dollars to file a labor arbitration case; now,
it is free of charge. The lack of a monetary barrier to sue has provided
employees with an outlet in which to try their luck with an arbiter, whether
their grievance is large or small and even if they were at fault.'0 2 Some
employees not entitled to full-time employee benefits, i.e. part-time
employees or those hired on a consulting basis, have used the arbitration
system as a means of threatening employers into providing full benefits

98.
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because of employers' fear of litigation.10 3 Meanwhile, other employees
simply do not understand the new LCL, thinking they have the right to sue
based on minor and major issues alike, and some readily sue, thus further
burdening companies with undue litigation.'°4
Furthermore, a significant upsurge in litigation has presented the
Chinese government with a huge problem, a lack of resources with which to
enforce the law through arbitration and the courts.1 0 5 These bureaucratic
agencies have only minimally changed their staffing requirements and
funding over the last decade. Consequently, the arbitration committee and
court personnel are overworked. For example, in Guangzhou's central
Haizhu district, the arbitration committee only has three members who
work six days a week and hold evening sessions three times a week. 106
D. ArbitrationandLitigation Courts Favor Workers
According to some reports, the arbitration tribunals in mainland China
are biased in favor of employees suing their employers.'0 7 Because
arbitration tribunals are sympathetic towards employees-who are
traditionally seen as the weaker party-they will sometimes overlook a
contract violation by the employee. 10 8 In addition, sometimes tribunals
assume that companies can bear the financial losses more readily than
employees.'0 9 Therefore, more often than not, employees win in arbitration
or in court based on prejudice in their favor, thus creating huge burdens on
companies. On average, plaintiff-employees "won in more than ninety five
percent of the concluded cases, obtaining compensation for work-related
injury, recovering unpaid wages, getting job reinstatement, or obtained
other benefits such as labour insurance payouts."" 0 In total, employees
obtained equivalent to 1.5 million U.S. dollars in compensation and other2
benefits."' In addition, the burden of evidence lies with the employer,"
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thus making it easier for employees to bring a suit. Most often, the
employers' best evidence constitutes written records of how and when the
employee violated company policy. 113 However, even this will create
problems, if the FIEs have not invested time in updating company policy
and manuals to adhere to the new LCL. Furthermore, even when the
evidence favors employers, they are advised to settle before reaching labor
arbitration because of increasing costs associated with counsel, litigation,
and general diversion of time. 14
E. Some CompaniesPrefer To Shut-Down
At least some factories are choosing to discontinue operations to avoid
paying workers' claims for unpaid wages and severance pay. 1 5 Guangzhou
city even issued an emergency circular reinforcing the provisions of the
LCL for lawful mass lay-offs; it was reiterating that employers cannot
engage in mass lay-offs to circumvent the LCL's requirements."16
VIII. LABOR DISPATCH AGENCIES AS LOOPHOLES

Whether called temporary staffing agencies, talent dispatch agencies,
or human resource outsourcing, LDAs are intermediaries between the
employers and employees providing a workforce. LDAs form a triangular
employment relationship, whereby the employer-as client-pays an LDA
for providing an employee, who in turn pays a salary to the employee. This
triangular employment relationship provides employers with 7 an
intermediary which gives needed flexibility without breaking the law. 1
In the weeks preceding the adoption of the LCL, reports surfaced that
some companies were trying to conduct a "reverse-labor dispatch."
Employers would sever ties with their existing employees, have LDAs bid
to be the designated LDA, have the employees sign an employment contract
with the designated LDA, and be dispatched to their usual workplace. 118 It
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is estimated that approximately twenty five million people in the P.R.C.
work as "dispatched employees," especially in the construction industry." 9
LDAs are a preferred mode of obtaining a flexible, hence cheaper,
workforce because it ". . . reduce[s] key costs, including pay-roll taxes;
move their contributions to workers' social security benefits from their
wage bills to a tax-deductible cost; pay labor-dispatch workers lower wages
than contract workers for the same job; and reduce the transaction
costs and
120
risks involved in employing workers such as hiring and firing."'
Furthermore, because labor dispatch workers work harder to keep their
jobs, their presence alongside contract workers puts pressure on their
contract worker colleagues to work harder as well.' 2 ' However, LDA
supporters believe that it helps unemployed workers find at least temporary
work. 122 Although LDAs play a key role in helping unemployed workers
find a source of income' 2 3-albeit most often a temporary one-LDAs are
viewed as a corporate mechanism to curtail
the LCL's obligation to
24
conclude a labor contract with employees.
Not surprisingly, LDAs' main clients include FIEs' 25 who consider
using LDAs as a means to provide needed flexibility without the need to
conclude employment contracts. LDAs' promise of lower transaction costs
in the labor market-thus redirecting time and resources to strategic
goals-is the main selling point that captures companies' attention and
26
business.
27
The LCL for the first time in Chinese legal history regulates LDAs.1
Rather than ban LDAs altogether, the LCL's purpose is to legalize and
regulate them. Article 57 describes a required system of licensing and
registration, whereby each LDA must have a minimum capital of 500,000
119.

Josephs, supra note 19, at 380.

120.
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123. Some also believe that dispatch agencies play the role of trusted mediator between
employers and employees whereby employees have a fair chance at finding employment in a society
known for its nepotism. It is also the P.R.C.'s active employment policy to encourage the unemployed
to seek seasonal, part-time and temporary work for which labor dispatch agencies play a key role. Xu,
supra note 5, at 434.
124.

See id. at 434.

125. It is also fair to note that other main clients of labor dispatch agencies include statemonopoly industries such as power, tobacco, telecommunications and banks. Xu, supra note 5, at 452.
126. Id. at 434.
127.

Labor Contract Law § 2.

ILSA JournalofInt'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 16:1

yuan. 28 LDAs must sign at least a two year contract with all of their
employees. 12 9 They must pay monthly remunerations to the employed
workers, i.e. those who have been staffed at a company, and a minimum
wage salary to the unemployed workers, i.e. those who have not been
staffed, in accordance with the local minimum wage laws. 130 The LCL also
requires LDAs to keep records of contracts signed with clients, positions of
dispatched workers, the number of dispatched workers, the term of
dispatch, the amount and payment of remunerations and social security
premiums, and the liability for breach of the agreement.'31
In addition to the minimal regulations concerning LDAs in the LCL,
some of the relative provisions are vague and not interpreted. The most
prominent example of an ambiguity is the provision limiting LDAs to
"temporary, ancillary, or substitute positions."' 32 The vagueness of what
amount of time constitutes temporary work allows domestic industries and
FIEs a wide loophole to fully utilize LDAs as a source of a flexible
workforce with no obligation of signing a contract. 33
IX. CONCLUSION

The large trade imbalance with the P.R.C. has been characterized as a
growing area of concern for the stable growth of the U.S. economy. The
expansion of workers' rights necessarily translates into increased costs of
production for American FIEs operating in China. American FIEs
recognized this fact and for that reason they waged a strong lobbying
campaign against the LCL before it even got passed by the Chinese
government. Although the U.S. administration will elicit protest from
AmCham and the American FIEs in the P.R.C. by supporting the LCL, the
broader benefits to the nation outweigh the short-term political pain and
limited gain for those American FIEs. If American FIEs abide by the
LCL-thereby increasing their labor costs-the artificially low-priced
Chinese-made products will be less competitive in the international market
thereby helping to decrease the U.S.-China trade deficit. Many other
variables contribute to this outcome. For instance, if American FIEs simply
relocate to a neighboring country which offers cheap labor with few legal
128. Equivalent to approximately 70,000 US dollars; exchange rate from yuans to dollars as of
September 18, 2009. Google Unit Conversion, www.google.com/UnitConversion (last visited Oct. 5,
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restrictions and poor enforcement mechanisms, then a corresponding trade
imbalance with this new neighboring country would result. On the other
hand, neighboring countries may take the P.R.C.'s lead and institute labor
law reforms to create harmonious employment relationships that increase
the cost of labor thereby no longer being a source for cheap labor.
However, notwithstanding other possible variables, targeting the cost of
labor used to manufacture traditionally artificially low-priced products in
one of the world's strongest emerging economies should make a serious
dent in the trade imbalance that further cripples the U.S. economy.

